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Plaintiffs and Appellants Robert W. Duniap and Kathy L. Duniap (collectively the 
"Dunlaps") respectfully submit the following Reply Brief in support of their pending 
appeal. 
RESPONSE TO MAYFLOWER'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Mayflower Brief at pages 2-3 contains purported statements of fact about the 
history of title to the subject real property (the "Marsac Lode") without supporting 
references to the record as required by Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(7) and 
(e). At pages 4-5, Mayflower refers to an Affidavit of Robert M. Theobald that purports 
to describe actions by United Park City Mines, Co. ("United Park City") involving 
development of the Marsac Lode. Mr. Theobald's Affidavit is not part of the record, and 
United Park City is not a party to this appeal. Mayflower's statements regarding the 
history of title to the property and the alleged actions of United Park City are neither 
relevant to the issues before the court nor properly supported by the record. Accordingly, 
the court should disregard all such statements. Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'I Life Ins, Co,, 
588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978) ("This Court need not, and will not, consider any facts not 
properly cited to, or supported by, the record."). 
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ARGUMENT 
A. THE DUNLAPS' CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA, 
1. The Prior Appeal Left Substantial Issues Unresolved. 
Mayflower argues that after this Court determined record title to the Marsac Lode 
was in Mayflower, all other issues in the case were barred by res judicata, and the District 
Court was compelled to enter judgment for Mayflower. The only cases cited by 
Mayflower in support of this argument are Fisher v. Davis, 11 Utah 81, 291 P. 493 
(1930); and Falula Farms, Inc. v. Ludlow, 866 P.2d 569 (Utah App. 1993). Unlike the 
present dispute, neither of those cases involved reversal on appeal of an award of 
summary judgment that left other issues unresolved. Rather, in each of the cited cases the 
court concluded that one of the parties was entitled to quiet title as a matter of law and 
remanded with explicit instructions to enter a decree in favor of the specified party. In 
the prior appeal in this action, however, the court reversed the award of summary 
judgment and remanded "for further proceedings consistent with this opinion." [Opinion 
on Appeal, attached to the Dunlaps' principal Brief, at 8 (emphasis added).] Unlike the 
cases cited by Mayflower, the first appeal in this matter left unresolved issues open for 
further adjudication, and this Court's mandate so indicated. 
Simply because both the Dunlaps and Mayflower sought summary judgment below 
does not mean the court was required to grant judgment to one of the parties. Diamond T 
Utah, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 21 Utah 2d 124, 441 P.2d 705, 706 (1968) ("[I]t is not 
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true that once both parties move for summary judgment the court is bound to grant it to 
one side or another. The law is otherwise."). There has never been a final adjudication 
whether the Dunlaps acquired title to the Marsac Lode by adverse possession, or whether 
Mayflower should be estopped from asserting title. Those issues remain open, as does the 
question of whether Mayflower is a good faith purchaser entitled to the benefits of the 
Utah Recording Act. The reversal of the earlier summary judgment in favor of the 
Dunlaps means the Dunlaps may now proceed to conduct discovery and fully present all 
available facts to the District Court on the remaining issues. Devil Creek Ranch, Inc. v. 
Cedar Mesa Reservoir & Canal Co., 126 Idaho 202, 879 P.2d 1135, 1138 (1994) (party 
was entitled to present additional evidence on remand following reversal of judgment 
entered on cross motions for summary judgment). 
This Court's opinion on the first appeal interpreted Utah R.S. § 78-3-3 (1933), the 
recording statute in effect in 1938, which stated: 
Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made, which shall not be recorded 
as provided in this title, shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser in 
good faith and for a valuable consideration of the same real estate, or any 
portion thereof, where his own conveyance shall be first duly recorded. 
[Emphasis added.] 
In order to claim the benefits of the recording statute, Mayflower must establish 
that it is a "subsequent purchaser in good faith/'1 Mayflower did not plead good faith or 
'The current recording statute, Utah Code § 57-3-103 (2004), also does not 
automatically apply to aU subsequent purchasers. It only applies if, among other things, 
3 
the recording act in its Amended Answer (R. 446-51), and the question of Mayflower's 
good faith was never addressed by the District Court. Mayflower's good faith should not 
be conclusively presumed without affording the Dunlaps an opportunity to conduct 
discovery and present the relevant facts. 
Numerous federal cases hold that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is 
not a final order entitled to res judicata, and that a contrary order may be entered 
subsequently.2 E.g., Moore v. Busby, 92 Fed.Appx. 699, 701-02 (10th Cir. 2004) (denial 
of summary judgment is interlocutory and subject to reconsideration upon presentment of 
proper support); Mulhall v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 543, 554 (6th Cir. 2002) (trial court 
properly revisited an earlier denial of summary judgment in light of additional evidence 
uncovered during discovery); Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(denial of summary judgment is not a final order with res judicata effect, and the trial 
court may permit a party to renew a previously denied motion on an expanded factual 
record); Goss v. George Washington Univ., 942 F. Supp. 659, 661 (D.D.C. 1996) ("A 
renewed summary judgment is appropriate where there is an expanded factual record."); 
and Advanced Semiconductor Materials America, Inc. v. Applied Materials, Inc., 922 F. 
"the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a valuable 
consideration . . .." 
2Utah courts frequently refer to federal cases for interpretation of the rules of civil 
procedure. LeVanger v. Highland Estates Properties Owners Ass'n., Inc., 80 P.3d 569, 
573 (Utah App. 2003). 
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Supp. 1439, 1442 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (earlier denial of summary judgment was not res 
judicata or law of the case). 
Contrary to the ruling of the District Court, the order denying the Dunlaps 
summary judgment on title by adverse possession was not a final order entitled to res 
judicata effect. When the award of summary judgment in favor of the Dunlaps on the 
theory of estoppel was reversed, it was also rendered interlocutory. Accordingly, the 
Dunlaps should have been afforded an opportunity to present additional evidence and to 
seek final adjudication after these issues were fully presented to the trial court. 
2- The Dunlaps Should be Permitted to Present Additional 
Evidence. 
Citing no other authority than Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Mayflower argues that the Dunlaps are now precluded from presenting any additional 
evidence on the issues of adverse possession, estoppel, or Mayflower's status as a good 
faith purchaser.3 This Court reached a contrary result on similar facts in LeVanger v. 
Highland Estates Properties Owners Ass 'n., Inc., 80 P.3d 569 (Utah App. 2003). There 
the trial court granted the defendants summary judgment on certain grounds but denied 
summary judgment on the basis of standing. This Court reversed. On remand the trial 
3The court need not consider arguments that are supported by nothing more than 
"bald citation to authority" without adequate development or reasoned analysis. State v. 
Shepherd, 989 P.2d 503, 510 (Utah App. 1999). The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly 
stated that it is not "a depository into which . . . [a] party may dump the burden of 
argument and research." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (citations 
omitted). 
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court ruled that the decision on appeal implicitly held that the plaintiffs had standing, and 
that the defendants had waived the right to challenge standing following remand. A 
second appeal followed and this Court again reversed, holding that the trial court should 
have conducted further proceedings on the standing issue, which was left open by the first 
appeal. 80 P.3d at 573-74. Similarly, in this case the District Court granted the Duniaps' 
motion for summary judgment on the issue of record title but denied their motion on the 
basis of adverse possession. Following the reversal on appeal the District Court should 
have held further evidentiary proceedings on adverse possession and the other open 
issues. 
Mayflower asks the Court to hold that the Duniaps have waived the opportunity to 
present further evidence, notwithstanding that no depositions have ever been taken and 
Mr. Dunlap proffered significant new evidence on adverse possession following remand. 
Mayflower's insistence that the court should turn a blind eye to any additional evidence 
and award Mayflower summary judgment contravenes numerous judicial statements that 
summary judgment should only be entered when it appears that the opposing party can not 
under any circumstance present a triable question of fact. E.g., Krantz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 
352, 356 (Utah 1991) ("Litigants must be able to present their cases fully to the court 
before judgment can be rendered against them unless it is obvious from the evidence 
before the court that the party opposing judgment can establish no right to recovery."), 
quoting, Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 
6 
(Utah 1984); Bridge v. Backman, 10 Utah 2d 366, 353 P.2d 909, 910 (1960) ("[U]nless 
there is a showing that the disfavored parties cannot produce evidence which would 
reasonably support a finding in their favor on a material or determinative issue of fact, a 
summary judgment is erroneous."). 
The Dunlaps have a substantial but as yet unadjudicated claim of title by adverse 
possession. It is undisputed that the Dunlaps and their predecessors-in-interest paid the 
property taxes on the Marsac Lode for over 60 years. (See Brief of Appellants at p. 3.) 
Following the reversal of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings, the 
Dunlaps proffered substantial new evidence to the District Court on their occupancy and 
"ordinary use" of the Marsac Lode within the meaning of Utah Code § 78-12-9 (2004),4 
and expressed a desire to conduct discovery on all remaining issues. (R. 661-672, 687-
692.) Mayflower argues that the Dunlaps waived the right to present further evidence 
because they did not make a Rule 56(f) motion in response to Mayflower's cross motion 
for summary judgment prior to the first appeal. Rule 56(f) would only apply, however, if 
the District Court had granted summary judgment in favor of Mayflower. Then the 
4Utah Code § 78-12-9 (2004) states in relevant part: 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any 
person claiming a title founded upon a written instrument or a 
judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed 
and occupied in the following cases: . . . (3) Where, although 
not enclosed, it has been used . . . for the ordinary use of the 
occupant." 
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question of whether the Dunlaps had made a timely Rule 56(f) motion may have some 
relevance. In the earlier proceedings, however, the District Court denied Mayflower's 
motion for summary judgment, so the Dunlaps were not required to seek a continuance 
under Rule 56(f). 
Mayflower cites no case that applies Rule 56(f) to bar additional evidence in the 
procedural context here presented, and Mayflower's theory contravenes the long held 
maxim that summary judgment should only be granted in clear cases of an absence of 
factual dispute. The Utah Supreme Court articulated the governing principle in Brandt v. 
Springville Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460, 462 (1960): 
"We are cognizant of the desirability of permitting litigants to fully present 
their case to the court and that a summary judgment prevents this. For that 
reason courts are, and should be, reluctant to invoke this remedy. Yet the 
granting of such a motion does have a salutary purpose . . . when upon the 
best showing the plaintiff can possibly make, he would not be entitled to a 
judgment." [Footnotes omitted.] 
Consistent with the above-quoted statement, following the reversal of summary 
judgment in their favor on the issue of record title, the Dunlaps should be afforded an 
opportunity to conduct discovery and present their case fully to the District Court on the 
remaining issues. The first appeal left open whether the Dunlaps can ultimately prevail at 
trial on the issues of estoppel or adverse possession, and whether Mayflower can establish 
a right to claim the benefits of a good faith purchaser for value under the Recording Act. 
Those issues all require further fact development. 
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Additional evidence to support a renewed motion for summary judgment need not 
be obtained through discovery, but may come from the moving party itself. For example, 
in Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1010 (N.D. 
Cal. 2001), the court granted a renewed motion for summary judgment on the basis of an 
additional expert declaration supplied by the movant. Similarly, in addition to conducting 
discovery on the remaining issues left open by this Court's prior decision, the Dunlaps 
should be afforded an opportunity to supplement their previously offered evidence on 
adverse possession and estoppel. 
B. MAYFLOWER IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ITS COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Mayflower devotes much of its Brief to arguing that it should be awarded its costs 
and attorneys' fees under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a) on the ground that the 
present appeal is "frivolous" or interposed for delay. Rule 33(b) defines a "frivolous" 
appeal as "one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on 
a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." The present appeal 
does not even approach that standard. 
The District Court anticipated at the hearing that there would "almost certainly" be 
an appeal by the losing party, whichever way it ruled. (Tr. (R.722) p. 30.) The District 
Court expressed concern about Mayflower's failure to file a counterclaim (Id. at 31), and 
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Mayflower has not cited to this Court any Utah cases that hold a party is entitled to a 
decree of quiet title without making a counterclaim. (Mayflower Brief at 11.) 
After this appeal was filed, this Court denied Mayflower's motion for summary 
disposition. Implicit in that ruling was an acknowledgment that the appeal presents 
substantial issues meriting further consideration. See, Utah R.App.P. 10(a)(2)(A). In its 
Brief Mayflower has cited no authority that requires this Court to affirm the District 
Court. On the contrary, the Dunlaps have shown that the District Court misapplied the 
doctrine ofres judicata and misinterpreted this Court's prior decision. For those reasons 
reversal is warranted. 
Mayflower further asserts that the present appeal is interposed solely for the 
improper purpose of delay. The Dunlaps filed this appeal for no such purpose. The 
Dunlaps are attempting to establish title to valuable real property that they acquired in 
good faith for substantial consideration. There is nothing in the Dunlaps' action that is in 
the slightest way improper. 
In support of its request for costs and attorneys' fees, Mayflower goes outside the 
record and has submitted an affidavit of Park City real estate dealer Robert M. Theobald 
who offers testimony about actions allegedly being taken by United Park City. Those 
allegations are irrelevant and improper. United Park City is not a party to this appeal, the 
Dunlaps do not control United Park City, and there is nothing in the record to establish 
that they are "partners" as characterized by Mayflower. United Park City participated as 
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co-plaintiff earlier in this action by reason of a contract for it to purchase the Marsac 
Lode from the Dunlaps. Obviously that purchase will not take place if Mayflower 
prevails in its claim of superior title to the property. Even if this Court were inclined to 
consider matters outside of the record, such as the Theobald Affidavit, the Dunlaps could 
not respond to his allegations because they are not party to whatever United Park City 
may or may not be doing. 
The cases cited by Mayflower do not support an award of sanctions. In Maughan 
v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989), this Court held that the appeal, although 
unsuccessful, was worthy of consideration and not subject to Rule 33(a) sanctions. The 
Court in Maughan noted that sanctions under Rule 33(a) should only be applied in 
"egregious cases, Test there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower 
court decisions.'" Id. at 162, quoting, Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 
1988). Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 1988), 
cited by Mayflower, was an improper appeal from a non-final order that was part of a 
series of delaying tactics calculated to postpone the collection of the defendant's debt. Id. 
at 1160. That case bears no relation to the Dunlaps' legitimate attempts to establish title 
to the real property here in dispute. Lastly, Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 
59 (Utah App. 1993) was a case in which the plaintiffs sought to relitigate a case 
following affirmance of judgment by this Court with no remand for any further trial court 
action. That case is therefore readily distinguished from the present action, in which this 
11 
Court remanded for further proceedings to resolve the issues remaining open after the 
reversal of summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Mayflower has failed to support the District Court's conclusion that all of the 
issues in this case were barred by res judicata. The District Court erred in refusing to 
permit the Dunlaps to proceed to establish their claims to title under the legal theories left 
open following the appeal. The judgment of the District Court should therefore be 
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this / ? day of February, 2005. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
B v : - < : / / - ^ / ; / 
Robert B. Lochhead 
Attorneys for the Dunlaps 
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